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Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Key Findings: –\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with… You must be logged in to view this content. … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[13,4],"tags":[54,104],"class_list":["post-11077","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-companies","category-control","tag-comapnies","tag-control"],"yoast_head":"\nStaff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process - Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process - Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Key Findings: –\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with… You must be logged in to view this content. … Continue reading →\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2014-04-02T16:21:38+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2014-04-02T20:45:19+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"2 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/iissonline.net\\\/2026\\\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/iissonline.net\\\/2026\\\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/iissonline.net\\\/2026\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/d9e91fd1a1523b3c7eebbee93de450a1\"},\"headline\":\"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: – Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) – Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) – Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. 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Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. 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Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: – Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. 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Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) – Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. 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Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process - Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process - Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire","og_description":"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. 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Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: – Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) – Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) – Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process","datePublished":"2014-04-02T16:21:38+00:00","dateModified":"2014-04-02T20:45:19+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/"},"wordCount":821,"commentCount":0,"keywords":["Companies","Control"],"articleSection":["Companies","Control"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/","url":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/","name":"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: - Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) - Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) - Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process - Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/#website"},"datePublished":"2014-04-02T16:21:38+00:00","dateModified":"2014-04-02T20:45:19+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/#\/schema\/person\/d9e91fd1a1523b3c7eebbee93de450a1"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/staff-report-slipping-through-the-cracks-how-the-d-c-navy-yard-shooting-exposes-flaws-in-the-federal-security-clearance-process-february-11-2014-share-on-print-share-on-facebook-share-on-twitter\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/iissonline.net\/2026\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Staff Report: Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. Navy Yard Shooting Exposes Flaws in the Federal Security Clearance Process February 11, 2014 Share on print Share on facebook Share on twitter Share on email More Sharing Services 2 Key Findings: – Non-cooperation of 450 police departments with federal background investigators \u2013 Federal law requires local law enforcement agencies to provide criminal history information to federal security clearance investigators. But Federal law is vague on exactly what must be shared and many local law enforcement agencies frequently shun federal security clearance investigators, by providing only limited, if any, information. New York City, Newark, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Seattle \u2013 where Aaron Alexis had a gun-related arrest \u2013 are all included on OPM\u2019s list of cities with non-cooperating police departments. Documents in the report detail incomplete information made available to background investigators, who did not know that a previous 2004 arrest of Alexis in Seattle involved a firearm and that a police report stated Alexis claimed to have suffered a \u201c\u2019black-out\u2019 fueled by anger.\u201d (Pages 18-19 and 40-43) – Lack of continuous monitoring \u2013 Under current law, a person holding a Top Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every five years in order to continue holding the clearance, those holding a Secret clearance must be reinvestigated every ten years, and those holding a Confidential clearance must be reinvestigated every fifteen years. In the intervening years, cleared individuals and their supervisors must report any derogatory information but there are no effective checks enforcing compliance beyond the renewal requirement. Numerous violent incidents from Aaron Alexis\u2019 post 2007 past \u2013 when he received his security clearance \u2013 would have only been recognized when his clearance required renewal in 2017. (Pages 32-35) – Regulations prohibit background checkers from looking at the Internet or social media when performing checks \u2013 Investigators conducting federal security clearance background checks do not see, search, or receive reports of the vast amount of information available online. Nor do current federal security process guidelines allow the adjudicators who grant the clearances to access this information. The current Investigators Handbook guidelines strictly prohibit the use of the Internet to obtain substantive information. The Handbook does not address the use of social media, but instead includes a near-blanket restriction on the use of the Internet. Regulations prohibit efforts intended to safeguard national secrets that many private employers conduct independently when making hiring decisions. (Pages 35-38) You can read the complete report here. Related Documents Slipping Through the Cracks: How the D.C. 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